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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MOSE ALIX, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents, 
vs. 
LEON BROWN, 
Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent 
APPELLANT'S 
Case No. 
9,167 
PETITION FOR, and BRIEF ON REHEARING 
Comes now the petitioner (the appellant and plaintiff in the 
former proceedings herein), and moves .this HONORABLE 
COURT, for a rehearing and reconsideration of its opinion 
and decree heretofore entered and filed in the above entitled 
cause, and for grounds and as bases for such motion, relies 
upon the following: 
( l) That this Honorable Court erred in its decision 
and opinion in holding that the four year, or any, statute 
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of limitations was applicable to the right of plaintiff-appel-
lant to proceed against intervening plaintiff and respondent. 
( 2) That this honorable Court by inadvertence and 
oversight, erred in its decision, respecting the quantum of 
proof of title to he required to he presented by intervening 
plaintiff and respondent Brown, to establish his tax title. 
( 3) That this Honorable Court by inadvertence over-
looked the proper quantum of proof as to the validity 
of intervening plaintiff and respondent Brown's purported 
adverse holding and possession of land under the seven year 
statute, and erred with respect thereto. 
( 4) That this Honorable Court, by inadvertence erred 
in its decision by failing to hold that there were issues of 
fact requiring trial involved. 
ARGUMENT: POINTS. 
The following points will be argued in support of the 
motion for reconsideration and rehearing, based upon the 
foregoing statement of erroneous conclusions in the majority 
opinion of the court heretofore rendered in this cause: 
I. - APPELLANT'S ACTION NOT BARRED BY 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
II.- FAILURE OF PROOF OF RESPONDENT 
BROWN'S TAX TITLE. 
III. - INSUFFICIENCY OF PROOF OF RESPOND-
ENT BROWN'S ADVERSE POSSESSION .. 
IV. - SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT TO SUPPLANT 
TRIAL OF FACTUAL ISSUES. 
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ARGUMENT PROPER 
POINT I. - APPELLANT'S ACTION NOT BARRED 
BY STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
The majority opinion of this Honorable Court assumes 
that the alleged deed submitted by respondent Brown, as the 
basis of his title from Salt Lake County, Utah (Rec. 28), is 
and was a tax deed, as used in connection with the applica-
tion of the wording of the various Utah statutes relating to 
(a) The presumptions to be given as to the validity of tax 
procedures, (b) As affecting the application of the statutes 
of limitation relating to tax titles. 
As very ably shown by the dissenting opinion of Chief 
Justice Crockett in Pender vs. Mose Alix, et al. vs Leon 
Brown, ........ Utah ........ , ........ Pac. 2nd ........ , from which the 
following is quoted: 
"It cannot be assumed that the plaintiff Brown 
has a tax title merely because of the fact that he 
received a quit-claim deed from Salt Lake County, 
which has no credit except its own recitals. Absent 
such an assumption, there appears not one scintilla of 
evidence in the record competent to prove that Salt 
Lake County ever acquired an interest in this prop-
erty, from any source, for taxes, or otherwise." 
it is apparent that the assumption in the majority opinion 
is erroneous in that it assumes a fact not in evidence, or 
proved by any competent evidence. And such assumption, 
being erroneous, as to the existence of a tax title in respond-
ent Brown, it follows then that the further determination of 
the majority of the court, as set forth in the prevailing opinion 
heretofore rendered in this cause: 
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"Under such uncontroverted circumstances, and 
applying the provisions of Title 78-12-5.2 thereto, it 
becomes obvious that Pender [appellant herein] was 
vulnerable to the four year limitations statute men-
tioned." 
that such would be erroneous, because, absent any competent 
proof in the record that Salt Lake County had obtained tax 
title to the property in question, there could be no proper 
application of the four year statute above mentioned in the 
quoted excerpt, since, no situation existed where a tax title to 
which said statute could apply is shown to be extant. 
Also, as heretofore set out in detail in Point II (Page 6) 
of Appellant's Original Brief, and in Point III (Page 7) of 
Appellant's Reply Brief, and in the Conclusion of the Appel-
lant's Reply Brief (Page ll), the filing of the original action 
herein in this situation tolled the statute of limitations. For 
brevity in presentation, further discussion will be omitted as 
to this latter material and authorities cited therein, hut, 
same IS hereby called to the attention of this Honorable 
Court. 
POINT II- FAILURE OF PROOF OF RESPONDENT 
BROWN'S TAX TITLE. 
The majority opinion of this Honorable Court, rendered 
herein, fails to give consideration to the fact, that even as-
suming that the respondent were endeavoring to quiet his title 
is an uncontested or default matter, that the quantum of proof 
as to his alleged tax title adduced in this cause, would not 
be sufficient to entitle him to a decree quieting his title, and 
the trial court would be justified in refusing to grant him a 
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decree by way of relief, since no introduction of a tax sale 
record, or auditor's deed, in order to prove that there was a 
tax sale, a transfer to the county or a third person, and to 
prove (at least prima facie) the validity of the steps taken 
of the proceedings up to the point of sale. Certainly, in cases 
such as the present, where there is an actual and protesting 
adverse party, certainly a less stringent rule of proof of the 
elements required or necessary to prove the existence of a 
tax title, and the proceedings relating thereto, should not be 
sanctioned as compared with a default case!!! 
Chief Justice Crockett's comments in his dissent, sue-
cindy illustrate the injustice of assuming to be so, what the 
statute requires to be proven, and, in the interests of clarity 
and brevity, his pertinent comments are quoted; from the 
opinion in the instant cause: 
"But nothing could be plainer than that these 
statutes rsections 5, 7 of Section 59-10-64 U.C.A. 
19531 were not designed to permit the use of the 
magic words 'tax title', and eliminate all necessity 
of proving that the claimant had something that at 
least resembled one. Even the most casual reading 
of their language indicates that they presuppose that 
before one could have their benefit, there must be 
some modicum of proof that there has been a tax 
delinquency and a tax sale. In other words, there 
must be at least some semblance of a tax title even 
though it may be iregular and invalid. But they 
cannot be applicable where there is a total absence of 
proof any tax title as is the case here." 
Under these circumstances, can it be that the majority 
opinion was meant to sanction in quiet title actions a lesser 
quantum of proof than is required by the statutory minimals? 
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If so, are the statutes then overturned? Is it no longer neces-
sary to bottom the proof of a tax title upon something 'show-
ing both the existence and validity of the tax proceedings, at 
least when certain instruments are by statute made prima 
facie evidence of the existence and validity of divestiture 
proceedings? It is believed, that viewed in this light, the 
apparent sanction of the majority opinion as to the quantum 
of proof required, being reduced below the statutory stand-
ards heretofore existing, is without precedent, and constitutes 
oversight resulting in error which should be corrected. 
POINT III - INSUFFICIENNCY OF PROOF OF 
RESPONDENT BROWN'S ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
The respondent Brown's further contention that his 
alleged deed from Salt Lake County considered as color of 
title, plus adverse possession and payment of taxes, creates in 
him a new title, seems to have been allowed without further 
discusion on the part of the majority of the court, and, by 
this action, it would appear that summary judgment has 
likewise been applied to give respondent Brown the benefit 
of his contentions. 
Here again, however, a careful examination of the 
facts and law, would indicate an oversight, or omission, on 
the part of the majority of the Court, resulting in compound-
ing eror, for, if, as heretofore demonstrated, no competent 
proof of tax title is presented by the respondent Brown, and 
no application of the short four year statute of limitations is 
warranted, then respondent Brown's reliance upon the seven 
year statute requiring adverse possession and usage in addi-
tion to the payment of taxes, is likewise insufficient for two 
reasons: 
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( 1) No adequate showing aside from the respondent 
Brown's own-self-serving declarations, as to the sufficiency 
of the nature of adverse possession is made, and, 
( 2) Such adverse use purportedly made, is, m fact 
denied, as evidenced by the introduction of affidavits of 
neighbors controverting such adverse use for the period 
requisite to show adverse possession. (See Appellant's 
Original Brief, Point III, Page 9). 
And, quite understandably, the Honorable Chief Justice 
in his dissenting opinion rendered herein, could not likewise 
countenance the lack of substantiating evidence to support a 
claim of adverse possession and usage for seven years, as 
he indicated in his dissenting opinion heretofore filed in 
this case: 
"Inasmuch as the case is being disposed of upon 
summary judgment, the issue of possession is not 
reached. Yet I deem it not amiss to make this obser-
vation: On that issue the defendant relies solely 
upon his own affidavit, which the fact trier may or 
may not believe because of his obvious self interest 
[Citing Pages vs Fed. Sec. Ins. Co., 8 Utah 2nd 226, 
332 P. 2nd 6661- He never has been subject to cross 
examination on the self serving statements therein. In 
dispute thereof are affidavits of two disinterested wit-
nesses who were present in the neighborhood during 
the years in question, concerning lack of possession 
and occupancy of the property 
Yet their statements are sufficient to cast grave doubt 
upon the claim of the plaintiff [respondent l Brown." 
Certainly, in view of the foregoing it would seem 
improbable that the issue of adverse possession in a contro-
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verted matter should be thus settled by summary judgment, 
and, yet, the net effect of the majority opinion is to do this!!! 
POINT IV- SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT TO 
SUPPLANT TRIAL OF FACTUAL ISSUES. 
Lastly, the holding of this Honorable Court, in uphold-
ing the summary judgment of the trial as rendered herein, 
is in effect denying the appellant the right to have this con· 
troverted issue of adverse possession determined as a factual 
matter. And, as set out in Point IV of Appellant's Original 
Brief (Page 11) such factual matters when in dispute, 
negate the disposition of the matter by summary judgment. 
The Honorable Chief Justice, in his dissenting opinion, in 
this case, recognized this shortcoming in the majority opinion, 
when it was pointed out: 
"It should be kept in mind that this is a review 
of a summary judgment, that it is a drastic remedy 
which deprivves the party of the opportunity to pre· 
sent his evidence, and which the courts should be 
extremely reluctant to grant. When it does so, the 
record must be reviewed in the light most favorable to 
the defeated party, and wherever the claims of the 
parties are in dispute, it must be assumed that his 
claim will be believed. This is so, because he should 
be turned out of court without trial only when, in 
viewing the record as above stated, and all doubts are 
resolved in his favor, he nevertheless would not be 
entitled to prevail (citing Young vs. Texas Company, 
8 Utah 2nd 206, 331 Pac 2nd 1099). 
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C 0 N C L US I 0 N. 
Upon these facts, and under these circumstances, It Is 
urged that this Honorable Court reconsider its former ma-
jority opinion herein rendered, in the light of the foregoing, 
and of the consequences and inferences which may flow 
from the decision as it now stands, and, that in connection 
with such reconsideration, that the original majority opinion 
herein be recalled or modified in accordance with the fore-
going arguments, and, that as sought in appellant's original 
brief, that a reversal of the summary judgment heretofore 
rendered by the trial court in this cause be granted, and the 
cause remanded to the district court, if for no other reason 
than that the respondent Brown has utterly failed to sustain 
the burden of his proof as to the existence of any tax title, 
or, as to his adverse possession acts, so as to warrant quiet-
ing his title. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
R. S. JOHNSON 
207 Atlas Building 
Salt Lake City l, Utah 
Attorney for plaintiff and 
appellant, Rennold Pender. 
Receipt of three (3) copies of the foregoing "Appellant's 
Petition for, and Brief on Rehearing", is acknowledged this 
27th day of September, 1960. 
Attorneys for Respondent, Leon Brown. 
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